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Abstract
In times of crisis, citizens’ support for democracy can depend on how well they think 
their democracy can address that crisis compared to authoritarian alternatives. Mexico 
is in the midst of just such a crisis, as its war on drug trafficking organisations has 
brought an unprecedented rise in violence and, in some areas, posed a direct challenge 
to the state’s capacity to govern. At the same time, its subnational political landscape 
ranges from vibrant, multi- party states to those with continued connections to a dom-
inant one- party past. We leverage these variations in subnational political context and 
levels of drug- related violence to examine how the subnational political context me-
diates the relationship between a crisis and support for non- democratic alternatives. 
When faced with a violent shock to the system, public attitudes towards democracy 
depend in part on one’s experiences with non- democratic alternatives and whether 
these authoritarian options appear to solve the crisis at hand more effectively.
Resumen
En tiempos de crisis, el apoyo de la ciudadanía a la democracia puede depender de qué 
tan bien se piensa que la democracia puede hacer frente a esa crisis, en comparación 
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con las alternativas autoritarias. México se encuentra en medio de una crisis de este 
tipo, ya que la guerra contra el narcotráfico ha provocado un aumento sin precedentes 
de violencia y en algunas zonas plantea un desafío directo a la capacidad del Estado para 
gobernar. Al mismo tiempo, el panorama político subnacional abarcades de Estados 
con un vibrante multipartidismo hasta aquellos con conexiones persistentes con un 
pasado de partido dominante. Aprovechamos estas variaciones en el contexto político 
subnacional y los niveles de violencia relacionada con la guerra contra las drogas para 
examinar la forma en que el contexto político subnacional media en la relación entre 
una crisis y el apoyo a alternativas no democráticas. Cuando se enfrenta un choque vio-
lento con el sistema, las actitudes públicas hacia la democracia dependen en parte de las 
experiencias de cada quien con las alternativas no democráticas y de si estas opciones 
autoritarias parecieran resolver la crisis en cuestión de manera más eficaz.
Keywords
Subnational politics,  crime and violence,  drug trafficking organisations,  Mexican 
democratisation
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Política subnacional, crimen y violencia, narcotráfico y narcotraficantes, democra-
tización en México
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Introduction
Public opinion scholars have long noted a willingness of mass publics to consider 
undemocratic answers to problems democracy seems incapable of solving. The extent to 
which citizens “give up” on democracy in times of crisis, however, depends not just on 
the perceived incapacity of a democratic system to fix the problem, but also on the per-
ceived viability of an undemocratic alternative. As Chang et al. (2007) note in their 
analysis of declining levels of support for democracy in East Asia, “When people have 
experienced (within memory) a variant of soft authoritarianism that delivered social 
stability . . . democracy now seems to be having a hard time winning hearts” (p. 75). 
Much of the work on people’s willingness to consider authoritarian solutions, however, 
has focused on the national level, masking important subnational variations in both the 
degree of the crisis affecting citizens and the perceived viability of authoritarian 
solutions.
In 2019, Mexico was well into its second decade of confronting just such a crisis, 
recording unprecedented levels of drug- related violence. In Mexico’s years- long war on 
drug trafficking organisations, the number of homicides linked to this conflict now 
exceeds 200,000. In addition to these victims, the conflict (involving the military, law 
enforcement forces and warring drug cartels) has threatened essential institutions of 
Mexico's fledgling democracy, silenced many media outlets, and eroded citizen 
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confidence in the government’s ability to protect them. The drug war, and all of its incen-
diary consequences, have impeded the ability of Mexico’s nascent democracy to deepen 
and make durable citizen support for the regime.
Though certainly a tragedy that has touched all corners of the country, the drug war 
has had uneven effects on Mexico’s thirty- one states and Federal District (D.F.). For 
example, the impact of the drug war has been limited in Oaxaca, yet the neighbouring 
state of Guererro has long been a battleground for violent drug- related clashes. Just as 
the drug war’s violent consequences vary tremendously across Mexico’s states, so too 
does the subnational political landscape. By the turn of the century, some states had 
already moved beyond one- party rule even before the historic ouster of the Institutional 
Revolutionary Party (PRI) from the presidency in 2000, while in other states the PRI’s 
grip on the governor’s office continued unabated.
The Mexican states vary substantially in terms of their exposure to the violence of the 
drug war and their experience with multi- party rule. This within- nation variation allows 
us to examine how the subnational political context may mediate the relationship 
between a crisis and citizen support for democracy. In order to do so, we focus on 
Mexico’s thirty- one states at a critical moment: the year 2010, when the drug war’s vio-
lence first peaked in several parts of the country, with homicides jumping from historic 
lows to an unprecedented high (at the time) of 22 per 100,000. Headlines around the 
country portrayed a nation under siege, with detailed accounts of cartels controlling parts 
of the country and carrying out unspeakable acts of violence against those who opposed 
them. By focusing on the year 2010, we are able to assess citizen support for democracy 
when the drug war crisis first hit the country. As this crisis affected citizens differently 
across the Mexican states, and these states had very different political contexts, we are 
able to leverage this subnational variation to test our principal proposition: that the polit-
ical context mediates the relationship between a crisis and citizens’ support for democ-
racy and its authoritarian alternatives.1, 2
We argue that in Mexico, the most salient component of this subnational political 
context is the extent to which states have moved beyond dominant- party rule, a staple of 
Mexico’s seventy- year authoritarian past. Though several states led the way in Mexico's 
democratisation process by ousting the PRI from the governor's office, in other states 
(e.g. Hidalgo) the PRI remained unchallenged through 2019. As the violence of the drug 
war first reached its peak in 2010, Mexico’s states varied a great deal in terms of their 
experiences with democratic alterations of power. We view the timing of a state's transi-
tion away from one- party rule, if it occurred at all, as an important element in shaping 
how drug- war violence affected citizens’ views towards democracy and its alternatives.
Such intra- national variations on these two key variables – the drug war crisis and 
one’s subnational political context – allow us to evaluate the role each plays in shaping 
citizen support for an authoritarian solution in times of crisis. We argue that in the con-
text of a violent and publicly graphic drug war, the more connected an individual’s sub-
national political system is to an authoritarian past that demonstrated some success in 
controlling drug- related violence, the more likely they will be to express support for a 
return to that authoritarian solution of the past.
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The article is organised into four parts. We begin with a theoretical overview, which 
explains how a crisis, particularly a widely publicised drug war, can affect citizens’ polit-
ical attitudes. We expand upon this literature to theorise how system characteristics in 
Mexico’s thirty- one states may have shaped citizens’ views of democracy and its author-
itarian alternatives across distinct levels of drug war violence. Second, we describe the 
situation Mexico faced in 2010 and explain why this was such a watershed year for the 
country’s war on drug trafficking organisations (DTOs). In this section, we document the 
differential impact the drug war had on Mexican states. In the third section, we explore 
the subnational political landscape and create three categories of state political contexts. 
In the fourth section, we employ these three categories, along with state exposure to the 
drug war, to analyse Mexicans’ views towards democracy. Here, we rely upon public 
opinion data from the 2010 Encuesta Nacional de Valores (ENVUD), a survey of over 
15,000 Mexicans designed to provide representative samples for each of Mexico’s states 
and the Federal District. Surveys were conducted at the height of drug violence of that 
year, in November of 2010.3
We find that in states where the drug war posed a significant threat to citizens, support 
for an authoritarian regime tended to be higher, but particularly in those states with 
strong ties to Mexico’s one- party regime of the past. In states where multi- party compe-
tition had become firmly established by 2010, citizens' level of support for democracy 
appears less vulnerable, even in the face of exceedingly high levels of violence. Our 
findings are limited to cross- sectional data, and based on two concepts- drug- war vio-
lence and subnational political context- that are notoriously hard to measure precisely. 
However, taken together, they offer evidence that the subnational political context, par-
ticularly linkages to an authoritarian style of rule that seemed effective in managing 
security threats, can shape how citizens view democracy and its alternatives in times of 
crisis.
Support for Democracy in Times of Crisis
Much of the early work explaining support for democracy focused on individual- level 
factors such as income, education, and support for the incumbent government. As Davis 
and Silver (2004) point out, however, in their study of the impact of 9/11 on Americans’ 
attitudes towards civil rights, “one of the most important findings of research on mass 
beliefs about democracy and civil liberties is the importance of context” (p. 28). In both 
emerging and established democracies, periods of foreign conflict, economic depression 
or an internal security crisis can erode levels of support for democracy and citizens’ 
commitment to the protection of civil and political rights for all. Indeed, it is one thing 
to profess support for democracy when times are good, but quite another when one’s 
country is under attack or suffering through a destabilising period of domestic strife.
In terms of citizen support for democracy, it is not only the magnitude of the crisis 
itself that matters but also the (perceived) ability of one’s current political system, and 
possible alternative systems, to respond to that crisis effectively. For example, Pennings 
(2017) finds that in Europe the “Great Recession” contributed to a decline in support for 
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democracy among those states with weak welfare systems, but support remained stable 
if not increased in those countries with well- developed welfare systems that could effec-
tively respond to the needs of citizens. This problem of performance is even more pro-
nounced in relatively new democracies (Carrión and Balasco, 2016; Dammert, 2012). As 
Diamond (1999) noted twenty years ago, “in relatively new and crisis- ridden democra-
cies, the effectiveness of the government in meeting public expectations directly affects 
the prospects for democratic consolidation” (p. 20). This posited role for system effec-
tiveness in shaping the impact a crisis might have on citizen support for democracy does 
not bode well for Mexico, which has found itself bogged down in an internal war against 
DTOs for more than fourteen years, with no end in sight (Heinle et al., 2017).
Diamond was among the first to caution that high levels of crime and violence could 
undermine democratic governance, particularly in emerging democracies where in “the 
context of weak states and inefficient, poorly disciplined police, crime may inspire dras-
tic, illegal, unconstitutional, and grotesquely sadistic responses to try to control it” 
(Diamond, 1999: 91). Over the past two decades, scholars concerned with democratic 
sustainability have increasingly cast their analytical lens on the relationship between 
crime and a variety of democratic attitudes and behaviours (Bailey, 2013; Bateson, 2012; 
Carrión and Balasco, 2016; Dammert, 2012; Malone, 2012; Parás and Coleman, 2006; 
Pérez, 2003).4
Though limited, the few empirical works that incorporate regime characteristics into 
their accounts of how a crisis can shape public support for (and opposition to) democ-
racy tend to confirm Diamond’s observations. In a comparative study of Mexico and the 
United States, Merolla et al. (2009) found that that under conditions of threat, respon-
dents exhibited “weaker effects in the U.S. [that] are consistent with our argument that 
support for democracy in established democracies should be less inclined to fall in the 
face of threat” (p. 11). In an analysis of democratic breakdown in interwar Europe, 
Bermeo (1997) finds that crime may have played a decisive role in undermining support 
for many of the region’s young democracies. She contends that what “seems to distin-
guish the casualties from the survivors in the interwar story is less the behavior of an 
actively anti- democratic public than the state’s capacity to provide what might be called 
civic order” (p. 19; see also Bermeo, 2003). New democracies tend to have a more diffi-
cult time maintaining civic order during times of crisis, as they typically must overhaul 
law enforcement institutions as part of the transition to democracy, a process requiring 
considerable time and investment. Consequently, due to the often lower capacity of 
those institutions charged with maintaining civic order, new democracies tend to be 
more vulnerable to spikes in crime and violence.
Studies of crime and political attitudes in Latin America provide additional evidence 
that the impact of a security crisis can vary across political systems. In a comparative 
analysis of post- conflict Central American countries, Cruz (2003) finds that in Guatemala 
and El Salvador, crime significantly reduced citizens’ satisfaction with democracy, but in 
Nicaragua, there was no relationship between the two. A study by Malone (2012) of 
Central American countries finds that crime can render citizens more willing to support 
authorities’ circumvention of the law in some cases, but its impact varied according to 
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the national homicide rate and the perceived performance of a country’s justice institu-
tions. In sum, the literature indicates that security crises can undermine democratic atti-
tudes, but this effect varies across cases.
The Drug War Threat and Mexico's One-Party Solution
To understand how such variations in political systems can mediate the relationship 
between a crisis and support for democracy, we turn to the subnational political land-
scape of Mexico. We focus on one defining feature of Mexican political development – a 
state’s initial ouster of the PRI (or lack thereof) – as a proxy for the degree to which 
citizens have direct experience with a functioning democracy, a dominant- party system, 
or both.
During its seventy- year period of hegemonic rule, the PRI largely controlled drug- 
related violence by imposing political authority over drug trafficking operations. When 
the PRI’s highly centralised system began to break down in the late 1980s, opposition 
parties in some states were able to oust the PRI from the executive office and end decades 
of one- party rule.5 Dube and Garcia- Ponce (2013) offer compelling evidence that this 
initial ouster of the PRI contributed to the rise in drug- related violence, as “increased 
[electoral] competition associated with Mexico’s democratic transition disrupted implicit 
agreements between DTOs and the long- ruling PRI” (p. 415) which, in turn, led to an 
increase in drug- related violence.6 According to Trejo and Ley (2018), the “subnational 
party alternation in gubernatorial power . . . [led to] the breakdown of protection" that in 
turn "motivated drug lords to create their own private militias to defend their turf” (p. 
930). Using a database of intercartel murders, Trejo and Ley (2018) link transitions away 
from the one- party rule of the PRI to increases in cartel- related violence, as DTO militias 
sought to protect (and perhaps expand) their territories from both new political authori-
ties and rival drug traffickers. Tragically, in the case of Mexico, “party alternation—one 
of the defining features of representative democracy—can be a trigger of large- scale 
violence” (Trejo and Ley, 2018: 930).7
Our theory linking a state's political transition with citizen support for democracy in 
the face of extreme violence rests on the degree to which citizens associate the solution 
to that violence with the electoral ouster of incumbents (the democracy option) or the 
retrenchment of a dominant- party system (the authoritarian option). By the time drug 
war violence first peaked in 2010, citizens in some states had more than a decade of 
experience with multi- party politics and concrete evidence that they have the ability to 
remove an incumbent who proves ineffective through democratic means. Such concrete 
experiences with the electoral removal of a governor from office should increase the 
likelihood that more citizens in these states will view democracy as the most peaceful 
route towards a viable solution.
In contrast, in dominant- party states where citizens have not witnessed such peaceful 
alternations in power, citizens may perceive the most viable solution to the sudden emer-
gence of drug war- related violence to be the strengthening of the PRI’s political control 
in order for the system to work most effectively. In this context, the appeal of democratic 
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elections and the ability to remove the incumbent government may be minimal; citizens 
may think that only a more powerful, dominant party can exert the power of the state to 
contain the threat of DTO violence. This appeal of a dominant- party solution to drug 
war- related violence may be even stronger in those states where the spike in such vio-
lence coincided with the initial ouster of the PRI. In such states, it is likely that citizens 
could associate the outbreak of violence with the onset of multi- party democracy, and 
thus favour a return to dominant- party rule.
We can test these ideas in Mexico. The Mexican states vary along the two important 
dimensions driving our expectations. First, in terms of the state's political context, in 
some states the critical first electoral defeat of the PRI took place in the 1990s, in others 
it coincided with the onset of the country's drug war in the mid- 2000s, and in others such 
an alternation never took place. Second, the spatial distribution of drug war- related vio-
lence varies substantially. In some states, violence and insecurity related to the drug war 
were minimal, while other states faced near wartime levels of violence. These subna-
tional variations allow us leverage in assessing the degree to which political context and 
drug- related violence influence citizens’ attitudes towards democracy. More concretely, 
we posit the following:
1. Citizens living in PRI- dominant states with high levels of drug violence may be 
more likely to see democracy as an impediment to the dominant- party's ability 
to exert control over cartels and curb the violence associated with the drug trade.
2. Citizens living in states where the PRI's one- party dominance had long eroded 
by the time cartel violence emerged, however, would perhaps have a more nu-
anced understanding of what democracy can, and cannot, accomplish. These cit-
izens may be reluctant to turn on democracy, and more likely to simply employ 
democratic mechanisms to remove the incumbent from office. Arguably, citizens 
with a more realistic understanding of what a democratic regime can and cannot 
provide should be more resistant to the appeal of an authoritarian solution to the 
crisis.
3. In states where the ouster of the PRI coincided with the onset of the drug war, 
citizens may be more likely to associate the arrival of democracy with the insta-
bility, uncertainty, and increased lawlessness that came with the war on DTOs. 
These citizens may be more inclined to express support for the perceived sta-
bility offered by the one- party political system of the past. We argue that this is 
particularly likely given the very public displays of violence, murder and extor-
tion that characterise Mexico’s drug war, which were designed to frighten and 
intimidate citizens.
We aim to understand how these subnational variations in political context (i.e. PRI- 
dominant states, multi- party states and first alternation states) interact with different lev-
els of drug war intensity to shape attitudes towards democracy and its authoritarian 
alternatives. In order to do so, we turn now to our classification of the thirty- one Mexican 
states in terms of political context and the intensity of the drug war (circa 2010).
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Mexico’s Drug War and Its Subnational Consequences
The year 2010 represented the nadir of Mexico’s first decade of democracy. Not only did 
the country still confront the aftermath of the debilitating economic crisis of 2008–2009, 
it also faced an unprecedented rise in drug war violence. This year marked the point at 
which the government’s war on DTOs became a full- blown crisis in some parts of the 
country, with extreme violence increasingly characterised by highly publicised “behead-
ings, dismemberment, torture, and other acts of unimaginable cruelty” (Ríos and Shirk, 
2011: 13). Notably, though, even by 2010, there were many states that remained virtually 
untouched by the drug war (Ríos and Shirk, 2011: 9).
Of particular import for our analysis is the fact that much of this violence was orches-
trated in a way to capitalise on publicity, involving particularly gruesome images of 
beheadings, bodies hanging from bridges and audacious grenade attacks on public build-
ings (Ríos and Shirk, 2011). The notoriety of this wave of violence underscores the 
importance of local context, as all citizens living in certain areas were made aware of the 
bloodiness of the war on a daily basis, even if they were not directly affected by it.
Another important feature of this wave of violence was its geographic concentration 
in certain parts of the country. As is clear in Figure 1,8 citizens in some states were 
caught on the front lines of the drug war in 2010, while others enjoyed relative peace. In 
the case of Chihuahua, the drug- related homicide rate reached a shocking 152 homicides 
per 100,000.9 In contrast, in states like Yucatán, the war on DTOs- at least as measured 
by drug- related homicide data- barely registered. The selectivity of the drug war violence 
is most notable in the neighbouring states of Morelos and Puebla, where the former reg-
istered over twenty drug- related homicides per 100,000 in the 2009–2010 period, while 
the latter recorded a rate of just over one per 100,000. We have, then, significant varia-
tion in one of our critical independent variables, levels of drug- related violence.
Not surprisingly, there is a strong correlation between states with high levels of drug- 
related homicides and those with high levels of overall homicide rates.10 There are, how-
ever, a few states that recorded very low levels of drug- related violence but registered 
significantly higher overall homicide rates. Most notably, Oaxaca reported under five 
drug- related homicides per 100,000, but a total homicide rate nearly four times higher 
(18.6 per 100,000). This high level of overall homicides in states like Oaxaca, one of the 
least developed in Mexico, was due to longstanding problems of inequality, poverty and 
human development; indeed, empirical models find that these root causes typically 
explain almost half the variance in homicide rates (Fajnzylber et al., 2002).
Our present analysis, however, is not motivated by these stable, long- standing 
homicide trends. We aim to focus instead on the very abrupt change in the status quo 
linked to the Mexican drug war, as such sharp changes in a state's insecurity context 
tend to engender a much stronger response from citizens than do longstanding trends 
in violence and insecurity.11 We are interested in understanding the impact of the 
extreme violence of the drug war, which abruptly did not just raise the overall level 
of homicide in some states but also ushered in a qualitatively different type of pub-
licly displayed violence designed to intimidate local communities (see Table 1A and 
Figure 4A in the Supplemental Appendix).12 States on the front lines of the drug war 
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deviated, in some cases quite sharply, from their more stable, long- term homicide 
trends, supporting our contention that for citizens living in these states, the arrival of 
the drug war during these years represented a highly visible departure from the status 
quo.
A principal challenge we face in evaluating the impact of drug war violence in isolation 
from other types of crime and violence taking place in a state is the availability of reliable 
data that distinguish between the two. As Shirk and Wallman note, "the availability of data 
on organized- crime- style homicides from the Mexican government has been limited and 
inconsistent" (2015: 1352). Because of these issues with government data, several private 
media outlets began compiling information on drug- related homicides as well. Though 
these data vary in scope and quality, when taken together they paint a similar picture of a 
rapid rise in homicides in certain states during the 2008–2012 period. In our analyses below, 
we recognise the noise inherent in these measurements, and analyse all of the data we have 
access to in testing our hypotheses.13
Figure 1. State Drug- Related Homicide Rates (2009–2010).
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Mexico’s Subnational Political Landscape
We now turn to a brief discussion of our second critical variable, state- level political 
systems. By most accounts, Mexico’s regime transition from an authoritarian, one- party 
system to a multi- party democracy took its most definitive step with the 2000 election of 
Vicente Fox of the centre- right National Action Party (PAN) to the presidency. Though 
other significant points in Mexico’s democratic transition also merit mention (such as the 
PRI’s loss of majority control of the legislature in 1997), the peaceful alternation of 
control over the country’s most powerful political office in 2000 signalled the beginning 
of a new era of competitive, multi- party electoral politics. While still a long way from 
being fully democratic, the ouster of the PRI in 2000 was a significant step away from 
the country’s one- party, authoritarian past. It is this watershed moment of the PRI’s 
ouster from the executive branch that we view as equally important in understanding the 
political transitions of Mexico’s thirty- one states.14 As we noted earlier, in some states 
this watershed moment undermined prior arrangements with the PRI and DTOs, usher-
ing in unprecedented levels of drug- related violence (Trejo and Ley, 2018).
By 2010, all of Mexico’s state political systems were democratic to varying degrees. 
By this point, all held reasonably free and fair elections, multiple political parties com-
peted for and won elections for local mayorships and state legislative seats, and few 
exhibited overt signs of retaining the authoritarian machines that characterised many 
parts of Mexico throughout much of the 20th century. Yet in some of these states, the PRI 
still had yet to relinquish its more than eighty- year control over the governor’s office.15
Does this automatically brand these states as “authoritarian”? No, but the uninter-
rupted rule of the PRI, in our mind, is indicative of a political system that has yet to fully 
and undeniably leave behind its one- party past (Lawson, 2000).16 To be clear, this criti-
cal first alternation in power does not necessarily mean the state suddenly becomes more 
democratic, or that it will forever be immune to political malfeasance, or the emergence 
of a new era of one- party rule under a non- PRI party.17 What the ousting of the PRI does 
tell us, however, is that the citizens of this state have managed to end eight decades of 
rule by a single party. We view the PRI’s initial exit from the governor’s office, just as 
many view the PRI’s 2000 exit from the president’s office, as a critical benchmark – an 
indicator of a potential transition towards widespread acceptance of competitive, multi- 
party politics in the future.
We focus on state political systems rather than municipal governments to assess polit-
ical context. By 2010, those states that had yet to see the PRI exit power clearly stood as 
the last, and strongest, links to the PRI’s one- party regime of the past (e.g. Langston, 
2017). Though such PRI dominance may have persisted at the local level in some of 
Mexico’s more than 2,400 municipalities, it was at the state level, and particularly in 
electoral battles over the gubernatorial office, where the strongest connections to the 
country’s one- party past persisted. While there was certainly significant intra- state vari-
ation in terms of both the level of violence and the degree of one- party dominance that 
existed in 2010, the most significant subnational political units in Mexico’s political 
transition and its war on drug trafficking were the states. It is for these reasons, then, that 
we focus our analytical lens in the following discussions on the state level.18
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Our first category of state political systems is what we refer to as a “contested one- 
party” system. In these states a multi- party electoral environment exists, but the PRI has 
never accepted gubernatorial defeat. In 2010, ten of Mexico’s thirty- one states were in 
this category, with another three voting the PRI out of office in the July gubernatorial 
elections of that year (Oaxaca, Puebla and Sinaloa). Our second category of subnational 
political environments includes those states that had successfully ousted for the first time 
the PRI from the executive office by November of 2010 – the point at which our survey 
data were collected.19 We classify these cases as “first alternation” states, a period we 
see as lasting through the initial six- year term of the first non- PRI governor. These states 
were trying to move beyond eight decades of PRI rule at precisely the time when the 
country’s drug war- related violence reached unprecedented levels. Further, the PRI’s 
defeat in these states required an enormous, collective effort on the part of all opposition 
parties, often with two ideologically opposed parties, the National Action Party (PAN) 
and the Democratic Revolution Party (PRD), joining forces to present a coalition candi-
date in order to eject the PRI from the governor’s office. Thus, even in the best of times, 
these first non- PRI administrations would have faced significant governance challenges. 
When combined with the dramatic rise in violence and, in 2009, one of the worst eco-
nomic crises ever to hit Mexico, the obstacles confronted by these “first alternation” 
states were considerable.
Our final category of political environments is “established multi- party” states, where 
at least one alternation in power had occurred and a subsequent round of gubernatorial 
elections had taken place prior to 2010. Once completing that critical first term of alter-
nation, it should be clear to all relevant actors that a credible multi- party system is in 
place where any political party can lose, even the PRI. Though these political systems 
may have many flaws, indeed some may be just as corrupt and nepotistic as some of our 
“contested one- party” states, citizens in “established multi- party” states at least will 
have concrete evidence that their political system has moved forward from the PRI’s 
one- party system of the past. In sum, we have ten “contested one- party” states, five “first 
alternation” states and sixteen states in the “established multi- party” category.20
Before moving to our analysis of the ways in which these distinct subnational politi-
cal contexts interact with levels of drug war violence to influence citizens' views of 
democracy, we first need to briefly address the question of why some states were able to 
oust the PRI in the 1990s while in others the PRI remains in power to this day. If all 
dominant- party states for example were poor, rural states concentrated in one region of 
the country, one might posit that these characteristics also might help explain variations 
in citizens' views of democracy. In fact though, the group of states that have ousted the 
PRI and those states where the PRI retains its grip on power are quite heterogeneous. As 
indicated in Table 1, the average gross state product in 2010 of multi- party states was in 
fact lower than that of dominant- party states. The literacy rates of the two groups of 
states is nearly identical, while the size of the manufacturing sector of multi- party states 
is only slightly larger than that of the dominant- party states.
If not socioeconomic development factors, then what does explain why some states 
were able to move beyond the country’s one- party past while others were not? Extant 
Journal of Politics in Latin America 12(1)14
research on this question focuses on two critical, and somewhat stochastic, factors 
related to state- level political elites. The first concerns the PRI itself and whether or not 
the state- level party elites have been able to maintain a united front in the face of myriad 
economic and political crises they have had to confront. The second factor is whether or 
not rival opposition party leaders within the state, typically those from the left- of- centre 
PRD and the right- of- centre PAN, were able to put aside their differences and put forth 
a coalition- backed candidate for the governor's race. When this perfect storm came 
together for a state, the chances of ousting the PRI improved considerably. As Petersen 
(2018) concluded in his study of these critical elections across Mexico, “one important 
finding is that the behaviour of either elites alone [authoritarian and the opposition] does 
not explain turnovers in these cases, and that for turnovers to happen, this [PRI] rupture 
should appear jointly with the unification of the opposition, including the groups that 
defected from the authoritarian elite” (p. 34). Given the disparate socioeconomic settings 
in which such watershed defeats of the PRI have occurred over the past thirty years, and 
the confluence of elite behaviours that appear necessary for these to occur, we are confi-
dent that there is not some underlying factor in either group of states that we do not 
include in our analyses below that is systematically driving differences in citizens’ atti-
tudes towards democracy when confronted with high levels of violence.
As our analysis rests on data gathered at a single point in time, we do not pretend to 
be able to establish a causal relationship between one’s subnational political system and 
one’s views of democracy when confronted with high levels of violence. What we do 
hope to offer, however, is a set of evidence that is consistent with our theoretical expec-
tations and supports the proposition that one’s views of democracy are in part a function 
of the characteristics of the subnational democracy in which one lives.






% households with 
piped water
(2010)
Established multi- party 7,368 92.95 93.55
First alternation 5,933 87.35 85.15




Source for female literacy rates and households with piped water is the 2010 Mexican Census (https://
www.inegi.org.mx/programas/ccpv/2010/). GSP/capita based on 2008 constant prices and pesos converted 
to US$ at 12.7 pesos/US$ (~exchange rate 1 January 2010). Source for GSP data is INEGI “Banco de 
datos” (https://www.inegi.org.mx/datos/).
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Subnational Variations in Violence and Political Context
Our next step is to combine these distinct state- level political system characteristics with an 
assessment of each state’s proximity to the front lines of the drug war. In order to construct 
a measure that identifies the states in which the drug war had reached crisis levels by 2010, 
as a first step we rely on data released by the office of the president on drug- related homi-
cides gathered by various sources.21 As noted above, we fully recognise the concerns with 
the drug war- related homicide data released by the Calderón government in 2011 that pur-
ported to offer information on homicides connected specifically to drug trafficking organi-
sations.22 We nonetheless begin our analyses with those data as they allow for the most 
direct, albeit noisy, measure of the concept we wish to capture – the extent to which a state 
found itself in the midst of the drug war in 2010. In addition, we carry out extensive analyses 
of total homicide data collected by the Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (2018) 
in order to further evaluate our propositions.
Our argument is not necessarily a linear one that requires evidence of a positive cor-
relation between an increasing number of murders and declining support for democracy. 
Rather, our intent is simply to identify those states where the drug war violence was most 
evident in 2010. With that rather blunt measurement goal we are afforded the opportu-
nity to employ a range of measurement strategies, with the hope that all ultimately pro-
duce similar results. To that end, we run myriad analyses using both drug war- related and 
overall homicide data provided by distinct sources. To ensure our findings are robust, we 
use both sets of these data to categorise and identify those states most significantly 
caught in the drug war by 2010. Our hope is that by employing these various measure-
ment strategies we can mitigate concerns with any one approach in particular. In the 
process, we endeavour to account for the highly imprecise nature of both the concept we 
are attempting to capture, drug war violence, and the data we have available to us.
To identify those states with high levels of drug- related violence, we begin with the 
data provided by the Office of the President and the Trans- Border Institute. Both sets of 
data find a sharp divide in 2010 between thirteen states that recorded double- (or triple-) 
figure levels of drug war homicides (per 100,000), and the remainder of the states in 
which drug- related violence was significantly lower. As Figure 4A in the Supplemental 
Appendix indicates, most of the states with high levels of drug- related violence also 
experienced a sudden and sizeable increase in long- term overall homicide trends. 
Citizens in these states would have witnessed a sudden rise in homicide rates, which 
tends to provoke a stronger reaction from citizens than more gradual increases. Since the 
survey data we analyse in the following section were collected in November of 2010, we 
use the monthly “drug- related homicides” data supplied by the Office of the President to 
calculate a rate for October 2009 to October 2010 as a basis for categorising states as 
either on the front lines of the drug war or not.23 In recognition of the inherently impre-
cise nature of where one draws a line in the construction of a dichotomous variable, we 
also employ continuous treatments of our measure of violence in subsequent analyses.
Though largely similar, a comparison of overall homicide rates and drug- related 
homicides do reveal one notable difference: the state of Oaxaca. As we briefly discussed 
above, this difference highlights our rationale for beginning our analysis with these 
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drug- related homicide data, however noisy those data may be, to identify those states 
most afflicted by the drug war in 2010, and to distinguish them from states like Oaxaca 
that have historically registered high homicide rates but were relatively untouched by the 
country's drug war. Indeed, by 2010, Oaxaca was in the midst of a significant decline in 
violence from levels in the 1990s, with the state experiencing a 64 per cent reduction in 
its homicide rate between 2003 and 2012, moving in the exact opposite direction to those 
states on the front lines of the drug war (Institute for Economics and Peace, 2014). It is 
precisely for this reason that we first analyse the drug- related homicide data before 
exploring the overall homicide data.
A second measurement choice we make also merits discussion – namely our decision 
to dichotomize a “drug war” variable that is based on continuous homicide data. Our 
theoretical account of the drug war crisis and how it may have affected citizens’ views 
towards democracy and authoritarianism informs this measurement decision. As we are 
concerned more with the contextual effects of the drug war, as opposed to individuals’ 
direct experiences with the violence associated with that war, we view a dichotomous 
treatment of this concept as more useful and accurate than a continuous treatment. 
Further, the bluntness of our dichotomous approach to measuring a state’s level of vio-
lence is consistent with the imprecise nature of the homicide data we are relying on to 
assess that violence.
Though clearly involving some degree of subjectivity in determining where to draw 
the line between the drug war hot spots in 2010 and other less affected areas, we feel 
comfortable relying on the sizable gap in the homicide rates of Jalisco and Nuevo Leon 
in both the Reforma and Presidencia data as a basis for this choice (see Figure 1). Further, 
this gap in homicide rates also corresponds to the divisions employed by the World 
Health Organization (WHO), which classifies a country as suffering from a “violence 
epidemic” when it registers homicide rates above 10/100,000 (World Bank, n.d.). That 
said, and again with an eye towards assessing the robustness of our findings, we also 
evaluate our propositions using a continuous form of our homicide data, with the results 
of these presented in the Supplemental Appendix (see Table 8A).
We categorise each state in terms of our three political context categories (“contested 
one- party, “first alternation”, and “established multi- party”) and the context of the drug 
war (“high” or “low” violence), providing us with six categories of states. Table 2 offers 
a look at how Mexico’s thirty- one states are sorted across these six categories, and Map 1 
displays their geographic distribution. For purely analytical purposes, the fact that each 
category includes at least two states allows a bit more leverage for us to carry out mean-
ingful comparisons of respondents across these six categories.24
Subnational Variations in Crime’s Impact on Support for Democracy
We now turn to assess how well these categories help us understand the impact of the 
drug war on political attitudes and behaviours. To measure respondents’ levels of sup-
port for democracy, we rely on two items from the ENVUD survey:
(1) “Do you think democracy is a good or bad form of government for Mexico?”
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a. “Good”
b. “Bad”
c. “Neither good nor bad”
(2) “With which of the following statements do you most agree?
a. “Democracy is preferable to any other form of government.”
b. “In some situations, an authoritarian government is preferable.”
c. “For people like me, having a democratic regime doesn’t really matter.”25
We expect citizens living in states with high levels of violence to be less supportive 
of democracy than those in states with low levels of violence. However, we argue that 
Table 2. Political Context and Violence Categories.
Low violence High violence
Contested one- party Campeche, Hidalgo, México, Quintana 
Roo, Tabasco, Veracruz
(ENVUD survey N = 3091)
Coahuila, Colima, Durango, 
Tamaulipas
(ENVUD survey N = 1585)
First alternation Oaxaca, Puebla
(ENVUD survey N = 1177)
Guererro, Sonora, Sinaloa
(ENVUD survey N = 1224)
Established multi- party Aguascalientes, BCS, Chiapas, 
Guanajuato, Jalisco, Querétaro, 
San Luis Potosí, Tlaxcala, Yucatán, 
Zacatecas
(ENVUD survey N = 4872)
Baja California, Chihuahua, 
Michoacán, Morelos, Nayarit, 
Nuevo León
(ENVUD survey N = 3138)
Map 1. Subnational Political System/Violence Contexts.
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this effect should be conditional on the characteristics of the individual’s state political 
system. Figure 2 provides initial, bivariate support for our argument: a state’s political 
context seems to moderate the degree to which a crisis such as the drug war affects sup-
port for democracy. Most notable are the differences among respondents living in high- 
and low- violence “contested one- party” and “first alternation” states. With low levels of 
violence, individuals in these two political contexts appear least likely to “prefer [an] 
authoritarian regime.” Given that these individuals have the most direct experience with 
uninterrupted one- party rule, this low level of support for an authoritarian regime in a 
low violence context makes sense. These are citizens ready to move beyond the one- 
party rule of the PRI. Once we add high levels of violence, however, we find that respon-
dents in contested one- party states are those most likely to consider an authoritarian 
regime as preferable in certain situations.
Conversely, the level of violence appears not to have much impact on citizens in 
established multi- party states. A slightly lower percentage of respondents in multi- party/
high- violence states expressed a preference for an authoritarian regime, compared to 
those living in multi- party/low- violence states. This finding is particularly intriguing as 
one of the states in the multi- party/high- violence category is Chihuahua, where the drug- 
related homicide rate was more than double that of any other state in 2010. The fact that 
we see very little effect of violence on support for democracy in this category speaks to 
the role that “regime characteristics” may play in shaping how crime and violence affect 
citizens’ views of democracy. We recognise, though, the need to submit these initial 
findings to a more rigorous multivariate analysis in order to put much stock in them.
Figure 2. Preferences for Authoritarianism Across Subnational Contexts.
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In order to estimate the probability that a respondent will opt for the anti- democracy 
option in each of the two survey items above, we run a series of binary logistic regres-
sion analyses for our three categories of states. In each model we include a series of 
standard socioeconomic controls (education, age, gender and wealth)26 along with 
numerous other potentially important factors that may influence attitudes towards 
democracy (see Table 4A in the Supplemental Appendix for a list of these variables, their 
measurements and descriptive statistics).
The one item we lack in the ENVUD survey that almost certainly would contribute to 
the overall model is a crime victimisation question. Such an item would allow us to 
assess both the impact of a high- violence context as well as personal experience with 
crime on support for democracy. We do include, however, a measure of a respondent’s 
perception of security that is based on responses to the question “How safe do you feel 
in your state?” While this item certainly does not fully suffice for a crime victimisation 
measure, our hope again is that it will serve as an adequate control for the individual 
feelings of insecurity that likely accompany crime victimisation.27
To assess the contextual effects that violence and the state political system have on a 
respondent’s views towards democracy, we take advantage of the state- level sampling 
design of the ENVUD survey data that essentially provides us with thirty- one represen-
tative state- level surveys. Rather than analysing the responses of the close to 16,000 
ENVUD respondents as a single sample, then, we carry out a split- sample analysis based 
on the particular political context of their states. Thus, we run separate models for the 
4,342 respondents living in “contested one- party” states, the 2,319 respondents living in 
“first alternation” states, and the 7,094 respondents from “accepted multi- party” states. 
We begin these analyses using the Mexican government drug- related homicide data as 
the basis for our “high violence” variable.
Table 3 displays the results of these analyses. Looking first at the various control 
variables we have included in the model, several results deserve mention. First, we find 
that our results for education and age largely comport with the conventional view that 
those with more education and older respondents are more likely to opt for the democ-
racy options in our two items of interest. It is worth noting that this finding for age also 
is consistent with the idea that for older individuals the appeal of a dominant- party, 
authoritarian solution to the drug war violence of the first decade of the twenty- first 
century would be decidedly coloured by their experiences during the PRI's disastrous 
years of the 1970s and 1980s, when the party managed to bankrupt the country despite 
discovering one of the richest oil reserves in the world. Second, our index of news 
exposure emerges as an important predictor of an individual's proclivity to express 
reservations about democracy. Given the overwhelming prevalence of media reports 
about the drug war and its many victims in Mexico, it is perhaps no surprise that respon-
dents who were more attentive to those media reports were more likely, all else equal, 
to view democracy as “bad for Mexico” and be more inclined to see authoritarian rule 
as a viable alternative. Finally, in most cases, respondents’ general satisfaction with 
President Calderón or the governor of their state corresponded to more support for 
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Moving to the variable of most interest to us, we see that the violence coefficient 
performs as we expect. In both the “contested one- party” and “first alternation” models, 
we find that respondents in those states experiencing high levels of violence were much 
more likely to opt for the undemocratic response than their counterparts in low- violence 
states. Conversely, those respondents living in “established multi- party”/high- violence 
contexts are in fact more supportive of democracy than those living in low- violence 
contexts. Once again, these results suggest highly divergent patterns of opposition to 
democracy depending on the interaction of one's subnational political system and the 
degree of drug- related violence in their state’s political system.28
For those states that have not yet completely moved beyond the one- party legacy of 
the PRI, support for democracy is high when violence is low but that support plummets 
when violence reaches critically high levels. In contrast, in states that were confronting 
such violence but had in place relatively well- established democratic political systems, 
respondents seemed less willing to give up on democracy. Simply put, the relationship 
between high levels of violence and support for democracy appears to depend in part on 
the characteristics of the democratic system in which the violence occurs.
Next, we run similar models using an assortment of other data and measurement 
strategies, including the use of overall homicide data, inclusion of respondents from the 
Federal District (classified as an "established multi- party" state), and a continuous treat-
ment of the homicide variable in order to assess the degree to which our initial findings 
hold up to alternative data and measurement specifications.The Supplemental Appendix 
includes results for the following modifications:
1. A continuous variable using the Mexican government's drug- war homicide data 
(Table 5A).
2. Models with dichotomous and continuous treatments of the drug- war homicide 
data that include respondents from the Federal District (Table 6A).
3. A dichotomous violence variable using the overall homicide data provided by 
Mexico's census bureau (INEGI) (Table 7A).
4. A continuous variable using the overall homicide data provided by Mexico's cen-
sus bureau (INEGI) (Table 8A).
5. Models with dichotomous and continuous treatments of the drug- war homicide 
data that re- categorise Oaxaca, Puebla and Sinaloa as "contested one- party" 
states rather than "first alternation" given the timing of their first opposition gov-
ernors taking office (Table 9A).
Table 4 offers a summary of these various analytical strategies and highlights the 
degree to which our central findings hold across these distinct sources of data and spec-
ifications of the violence measure.29 The first row of Table 4 summarises the key findings 
from our models in Table 3, and compares these to the results of models with different 
homicide data, measurements and specifications. The results for our contested one- party 
states are identical across all models in terms of significance and direction. In our first 
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changes in significance levels, and two coefficients are no longer significant. We see 
slightly more variation in the results for our established multi- party systems. In these 
states, the results for “democracy is bad” are largely consistent with our theoretical 
expectations across all the models, with only minor changes in significance levels. The 
results for the “preference for an authoritarian regime” models, however, reveal a less 
robust set of findings, with the coefficients in three of the eight models emerging as pos-
itive, counter to our expectations, and significant. What this highlights, perhaps, is the 
impact that the difference in wording may have on respondents in established multi- 
party systems confronting high violence – with more individuals willing to express a 
preference for an authoritarian solution but not ready to pronounce democracy as "bad 
for Mexico.” While it is important to keep these variations in mind when discussing our 
results, across all of these models, the core findings from our analysis remain – respon-
dents in states that retained strong ties to the PRI’s one- party past appear more willing to 
forgo democracy in the face of high levels of violence than those in established multi- 
party states facing similar levels of violence. Indeed, in forty- three of the forty- eight 
distinct models run, we found support for the propositions outlined above.
Conclusion
Taken together, our findings indicate that variations in political systems are an important 
component in answering the question “How do crime and violence affect support for 
democracy?” The cross- sectional nature of our data does limit our ability to establish a 
causal relationship between the onset of drug violence and the abandonment of democ-
racy by citizens living in certain states. Still, our data do provide the opportunity to 
compare citizens' attitudes across distinct political and crisis contexts within a single 
country, which enhances our confidence that variations in subnational political contexts 
do indeed influence the ways in which the outbreak of a crisis may affect citizens' 
attitudes.
Further, these findings are consistent with the many studies that have linked high 
levels of crime to declining levels of support for democracy, but we build upon this lit-
erature by placing the political system itself into the equation. When people respond to 
survey items about their views on democracy, they likely do not all have the same form 
of democracy in mind, nor do they share similar experiences of living in a democracy. 
We see these variations in political systems as essential in understanding how a crisis 
situation, such as a drug war with unprecedented levels of homicides, may influence 
levels of support for democracy.
Though our analysis focuses on the year the drug war first reached its peak in 2010, 
alarmingly high levels of crime and violence continue, tragically, to be a part of Mexico 
in 2019.30 Further, there remains more to be done to understand the relationship between 
the characteristics of a political system and citizen support for democracy in a context of 
crisis. Our analysis focuses on one pivotal year, and sets the stage for future longitudinal 
analyses of the relationship between crime and support for democracy in different polit-
ical contexts, as well as for the exploration of the crime- democracy relationship in other 
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subnational units, such as municipalities. By contextualising the linkage between crime 
and public support for democracy, we can understand how crime erodes public support 
for democracy, and take into account the characteristics of the political system that citi-
zens are being asked to support. If that political system offers very little, or is perhaps 
even linked with the rise in crime in the minds of citizens, then we should not be sur-
prised when those same citizens consider other, non- democratic alternatives as a possi-
ble solution.
More importantly, our findings suggest that for those Latin American democracies 
(both at the national and subnational level) that have established some type of governing 
credibility, high levels of crime may not be as damaging to citizens’ support for democ-
racy as previous research suggests. In other words, the stronger the democracy, the more 
able it is to withstand such challenges as high levels of crime and violence. Unfortunately, 
those countries most afflicted by drug- related violence in recent years, including Mexico 
and several Central American countries, arguably have some of the least established 
democratic systems in all of Latin America (World Bank, 2010). Further, at the subna-
tional level, many of these countries have political systems that are decidedly less than 
democratic, suggesting that high levels of crime and violence in these areas will lead 
citizens to increasingly consider authoritarian solutions, making efforts to deepen 
democracy in those areas even more difficult.
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Notes
1. We exclude the Federal District from our principal analysis due to the somewhat unique char-
acteristics of its political system. However, we do replicate all our models with respondents 
from the Federal District included (see Table 6A in the Supplemental Appendix).
2. In 2007, Mexico’s homicide rate was 8 per 100,000 and on par with that of Argentina and 
Costa Rica. Just three years later, homicide rates nearly tripled, and the national rate was 
comparable to that of Brazil. By 2018, the rate had reached another historic high of 29 per 
100,000. See Figure 1A in the Supplemental Appendix for a longitudinal examination of 
national homicide rates in Mexico.
3. The ENVUD represents a collective effort sponsored by Banamex, Fundación Este País and a 
group of donors interested in making a portrait of values and beliefs of Mexicans at the start 
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of the new decade. The following polling firms participated: Ipsos-Bimsa Field Research 
de México, S.A. de C.V.; Mercaei, S.A. de C.V.; Nodo-wmc y Asociados, S.A. de C.V.; and 
Pearson, S.A. de C.V. The polling firm Berumen y Asociados handled the sample design, 
monitoring, validation of data entered, and supported other polling forms during fieldwork.
4. See Malone (2013) for a more nuanced discussion of this literature, and how it informs polit-
ical attitudes and behaviours specifically in the case of Mexico.
5. For a discussion of the debates among advisors, public officials and academics regarding the 
causes and implications of the drug-related violence in Mexico during this time, see Poiré and 
Martínez (2011), Merino (2011) and Trejo and Ley (2018).
6. Dell (2015) also finds a sharp rise in violence associated with highly contested mayoral elec-
tions captured by non-PRI candidates.
7. Trejo and Ley (2018) also find that “municipal actors were not the central players [. . .] instead, 
officers from the state-level judicial police were the central organising actors”. However, in 
other countries, scholars have noted that municipal actors can shape security outcomes in 
their municipalities (Arias, 2017; Moncada, 2009).
8. As the survey data were collected near the height of the crime epidemic in November of 
2010, we first rely on monthly “drug-related homicides” data, supplied by the National Public 
Security System released by the Office of the President in 2011. We then also include esti-
mates provided in the Trans-Border Institute’s 2011 report on Mexico’s drug violence in 2010 
(Ríos and Shirk, 2011). These estimates are based on data gathered by staff of the Mexico City 
newspaper Reforma and can be accessed at: https:// justiceinmexico. org/ wp- content/ uploads/ 
2014/ 09/ 2011_ DVM. pdf
9. By the “front lines”, we refer to states that have rates of homicide on par with conflict coun-
tries. As a point of comparison, in 2010, Honduras had the infamous reputation of the murder 
capital of the world, with 81.8 homicides per 100,000. Chihuahua registered total homicide 
rates that were more than double those of Honduras – 182.5 per 100,000 in 2010.
10. Figure 2A in the Supplemental Appendix documents overall homicide rates by state in 2010, 
and Figure 3A in the Supplemental Appendix illustrates the correlation between these total 
homicide rates and our measure of drug-related homicide deaths (r = .986; p < .001).
11. See Hale (1996) for a thorough review of the literature on fear of crime, including public 
reaction to sudden changes to the status quo.
12. Table 1A in the Supplemental Appendix lists state homicide rates from 2006 to 2016 and 
Figure 4A in the Supplemental Appendix graphs the change in overall homicide rates from 
historic lows in 2007 to 2010 (the year of our analysis). In the states we designate as those on 
the front lines of the drug war, we see an uptick in murder rates in 2009 and 2010, when the 
violence of the drug war first reached its height.
13. We ran multiple iterations of our analyses using both the drug-related homicide data (which 
more adequately capture our concept of the drug war threat) and overall homicide data to en-
sure the robustness of our findings. See Tables 5A, 7A, and 8A in the Supplemental Appendix 
for full results from these models.
14. We recognise that the Federal District often is included as a state, and indeed, with the 2016 
Constitutional reform it now has full designation as a state. Given its unique government 
Hiskey et al. 27
structure that prior to 1997 was headed by a presidential appointee, throughout most of our 
analyses we exclude respondents from the Federal District due to the many ways in which 
its political system differs institutionally from those of the thirty-one states. These many dif-
ferences have ramifications for the justice system and law enforcement. For example, the DF 
uniquely maintains its own judicial police force, the Judicial Police of the Federal District 
(PJDF), under the Procuraduría General de Justicia del Distrito Federal. Nonetheless, in an 
effort to further explore our central propositions and allow for a consideration of the Federal 
District as functionally equivalent to Mexico's thirty-one states, we carry out similar analyses 
with survey respondents from the Federal District included and report these results in Table 
6A of the Supplemental Appendix. As the mayor of the District has been from the PRD and 
homicide levels in the city were less than 5 per 100,000, we place it in our "established 
multi-party/low violence" category.
15. This was true at the time our data were collected in 2010, as well as at the time of this writing 
in 2019.
16. We view this connection to the autocratic regime of the PRI as one important distinguishing 
factor among the thirty-one state political systems of Mexico. While fully recognising and 
appreciating the efforts by some scholars (e.g. Giraudy, 2015; Giraudy, 2013; Gervasoni, 
2010) to more fully capture the degree of democracy (or lack thereof) in each of Mexico’s 
states at a particular point in time, our measurement goal here is much less ambitious, but 
arguably more fundamental, to understanding the country’s subnational transition process. 
We do not attempt to measure the nuances of subnational democracy across Mexico through 
reliance on multiple indicators; rather, we merely wish to measure the extent to which a state 
had moved beyond the PRI’s one-party regime (as of 2010) in order to assess how variation 
on this dimension may affect citizens’ views of democracy during times of crisis. It is worth 
noting that in the majority of first-alternation elections that have taken place in the past ten 
years, an alliance between the center-right PAN and center-left PRD was required in order to 
defeat the PRI.
17. Though given the relatively short amount of time since the first alternations away from PRI 
rule occurred (most between 1995 and 2010), and the fact that governors serve six-year terms, 
it seems premature to label any of the states as newly one-party dominant in the same way that 
the PRI was dominant for over eighty years.
18. While municipal-level analyses are beyond the scope of this article, given the findings of 
Arias (2017) and Moncada (2009) concerning the ways in which municipal actors can shape 
security outcomes, municipal-level analyses of Mexico are an important area of future 
research.
19. For three of the states in this category, Oaxaca, Puebla and Sinaloa, the decisive election 
took place on 4 July 2010, and the victorious opposition candidate had yet to take office 
by November of that year. That the electoral process was respected and the PRI in each 
case showed no signs of refusing to leave office or overturn the election, we contend that 
these states do qualify for our “first alternation” category, albeit with an asterisk. Because of 
this, we also run all of our analyses below with these three states moved into the “contested 
one-party” category. See Table 9A of the Supplemental Appendix for those results – all of 
which were consistent with our theoretical expectations.
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20. For a discussion of the electoral competitiveness of these subnational political systems, see 
Table 2A in the Supplemental Appendix.
21. Substantively, we argue that drug-related homicides are the best measure of the context of 
violence we aim to gauge. However, empirically the rate of drug-related homicides overlaps 
a great deal with the overall homicide rate. As Figure 3A in the Supplemental Appendix in-
dicates, the correlation between overall homicide rates and drug-related homicides is quite 
strong, and most states cluster near the regression line.
22. See Shirk and Wallman (2015) for a thorough discussion of the various sources of homicide 
data available during this period and the commonly raised problems and concerns associated 
with these different data.
23. The same categorisations would result if we relied upon Trans-Border Institute data.
24. See Table 3A in the Supplemental Material 1 for an overview of socioeconomic differences 
and similarities among these categories of states.
25. We collapsed the survey responses “In some situations, an authoritarian regime is preferable” 
and “For people like me, having a democratic regimes doesn’t really matter” to measure sup-
port for authoritarian regimes.
26. The ENVUD survey does not have an item directly measuring either personal or family in-
come so we use two admittedly noisy items to capture at least part of the income variable: 
(1) Interviewers’ assessments of the wealth of the respondent’s neighbourhood and (2) An 
additive index of respondents’ self-reported possession of a landline telephone, cell phone 
and home internet service in their households (“communication index”).
27. Dammert and Malone (2006) document the impact of victimisation on fear of crime and fear 
of violence, and note that while these two measures tend to be significantly correlated, myriad 
other factors also explain individual perceptions of insecurity. In 2010, the Latin American 
Public Opinion Project’s (LAPOP) national survey of Mexico included measures of crime 
victimisation and fear of crime in one’s own neighbourhood. These two items were signifi-
cantly correlated at the .01 level (r = .199).
28. It is notable that the tendency of PRD supporters to opt for an undemocratic response is 
only significant, and powerfully so, in the “contested one-party” states. Though perhaps not 
surprising, given the persecution of PRD supporters in many of these PRI-dominant states, 
this finding offers further support that our categorisation strategy is indeed capturing distinct 
political system characteristics and contexts. Here the “contested one-party” context stands 
out as distinct from the other two in terms of how respondents who support a political party 
that we know to be one with a history of persecution by the PRI view the political system.
29. See Tables 5A–9A of the Supplemental Appendix for full results of these various specifications.
30. See Figure 1A of the Supplemental Appendix for trends in national homicide rates over time.
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